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CATHOLIC DIASPORA IN THE RUSSIAN M EDIA: “M ARGINALIZATION”
FROM OUTSIDE AND "SELF-SILENCING" FROM INSIDE
Victor Khroul
Dr. Victor M. Khroul, native of Byelorussia, received a Diploma from St. Thomas Aquinas
Catholic Theology College, Moscow, Russia (1995), and already held an MA (1986) and
Ph.D. (1993) from Moscow State University, Russia. Currently he is a Researcher in the
Journalism Department of Moscow State U niversity (since September, 1995), and a
professor, Saint-Petersburg Catholic Seminary (since January, 1998), as well as an expert,
at the Russian Information Agency “Novosti”. An earlier article appeared in the May
2010 issue of REE.
The Catholic community in Russia consists of less than 1% of the Russian population.
According to official data, there are about 600 thousand believers, the overwhelming majority of
whom are citizens of the Russian Federation. But, paradoxically, the Catholic community is
presented by the media mostly as a community of strangers with a ‘non-traditional’, imported faith.
At the same time the Jewish community (more or less the same number of believers) is considered
by the mass media to be ‘traditional’.
After many decades of religious persecution the Catholic Church in Russia was in a very
difficult position when it started to revive its ecclesiastical structures in April 1991. The church had
no buildings (only two had been opened - in M oscow and Leningrad), there were essentially no
priests (there were less than ten, many of whom had been working underground), and there was
no Catholic literature or Catholic m ass media, that is so necessary for evangelization and
catechization.
Even a brief historical analysis of the developm ent of Catholic media in the USSR and since 1991 - in the Russian Federation, which takes into consideration such concerns as statistics
and regional strengths, religious suppression/freedom, the opening/closing of media institutions,
a Catholic presence in the public sphere, church-state relations and other criteria, allow us to
divide the whole process into three periods.
The period of Soviet religious persecutions correlates with the time of underground
Samizdat and illegal media activity of Catholic communities. From the moment of the reestablishment of a Catholic hierarchy in 1991, the new period of rapid media development, based
on religious freedom and a Catholic revival in the country, started. It lasted till the time of restoring
of dioceses in 2002. After 2002, according to our observations, media development slowed down,
then stopped, as media were getting closed one after the other. The third period that we consider
a time of “self-silencing” by the Catholic Church in Russia, continues to the present.
There are several reasons for the processes of “marginalization” and “westernization” of
the Catholic com m unity in Russia. Here I propose to examine state policy, the nature of the
ecumenical context, the de facto media policy in Russia, and the policy of the Catholic hierarchy.
1. State Policy
According to the wide-spread public understanding, though not according to the law, as
implemented by government policy, there are four so-called ‘traditional’ religions in our country Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism. Their activity has priority in the public sphere, and, so
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far, in media coverage. Catholics, Anglicans, Protestants, and other religions appear in the public
sphere only occasionally.
"And while the concept of “traditional” religion is nowhere defined in Russian law,
Orthodox Patriarch Kirill, its advocate for more than a decade, has been successful in convincing
officials like President Dmitry M edvedev and Prime M inister Vladimir Putin to employ that term,
something that in the Russian context can have serious consequences", so noted Paul Goble recently
in his paper “‘Non-Traditional’ Faiths in Russia at Risk of Persecution,” published by the web
portal Liberty of Faith.1
74 percent of the 23,000 legally registered religious organizations are members of Russia’s
four “traditional” religions – Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. The remaining 26 percent
are members of other faiths, including primarily Catholics and Protestants, and they are facing
increasing difficulties. That is because of Russian understandings of “majoritarian” democracy and
of the way the rights of “majorities” and “minorities” are applied in religion.
Russians today, especially Russian officials, “often understand democracy almost
exclusively in terms of the obligation of the minority to subordinate itself to the majority and as the
right of the majority to dictate its will to the minority” and to “have the final word on all issues.” 2
In the case of Catholics, in fact, the Russian government does not have its own policy, mostly it
merely “mediates” and implements an Orthodox approach to Catholics.
M any experts agree that the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church towards Catholics
has traditionally been negative. “The Pope’s decision of February 11, 2002 to transform the
temporary administrative structures of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia into regular dioceses
stirred up a fury of protests in the Russian Orthodox Church”,3 Alexander Verkhovsky reminded
readers.
Patriarch Alexii II had stated in 1992: “W e view this as an aggression against Russia” and
added, that one of his predecessors, Patriarch Hermogen, “in tumultuous times opposed similar
attempts of the Roman Catholic Church to penetrate into Russia.” 4
The Russian Foreign M inistry interfered in the conflict between the Patriarchate and the
Vatican with an official protest note. Later on the Foreign M inistry denied visas to four Catholic
priests and one bishop. Since no explanations for those acts were given, one can only assume that
the Foreign M inistry stands in support of the Patriarchate against such an obvious symbol of the
W est as the Vatican.
In Russia, lack of experience of the two freedoms – of the press and of religion – as well as
of the principles of difference between secular and religious understandings of the limits of
freedom of expression, provide us interesting material for analysis.
Figure 1 below shows mutual correlations for media communications, when correlating
freedom and religion categories with public opinion, institutional media, state/local authorities and
the Catholic Church.

1
Paul Goble. “Non-‘Traditional’ Faiths in Russia at Risk of Persecution.” Liberty of Faith.
http://www.libertyoffaith.org/?p=81&cpage=2
2
www.baznica.info/index.php?name=Pages&op=page&pid=5964
3
Alexander Verkhovsky. Religious Xenophobia: Within Religious Orders and Between Religious Orders.
http://www.religion.sova-center.ru/publications/194EF5E/1951317
4
Ibid.
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Fig. 1.
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authorities
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in Russia
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Religion
Country of “non-believers”
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Cases of suppression
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Lack of solidarity with protestants
No evangelization activity
"Ghetto" behaviour

W e must also add that the impact of state policy on media policy is becoming more and
more visible in Russia, and so “non-traditional” Catholics became a factor of suspicion also for
some state-controlled media. That is why we observe some “marginalizing” effects towards
Catholics in the secular media.
2. Ecumenical context
The first ecumenical factor with strong media impact is Orthodox understanding of the
Pontifical Commission “Pro Russia” instruction “General Principles and Practical Norms for
Coordinating the Evangelizing Activity and Ecumenical Commitment of the Catholic Church in
Russia and in the Other Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)”, issued 1
June 1992.5 According to the document, the Catholic authorities are asked to provide for an
ecumenical formation for their clergy and to promote a climate of trust and peaceful cooperation.
They should also ensure that no Catholic activity appears to establish “parallel structures of
evangelization” over against the Orthodox.
The Pro Russia Commission also instructs Catholic authorities to inform local Orthodox
bishops of all their important pastoral initiatives, especially of the opening of new parishes. And
in a key passage the document even states that Catholic pastors should “endeavor to cooperate with
the Orthodox bishops in developing pastoral initiatives of the Orthodox Church. They should be
pleased if by their contribution they can help to train good Christians” (n. 4).6

5
English translation in Origins 22/17 (October 8, 1992) 301-304. French: Plamia 85 (Christmas 1992) 39-47 and La
documentation catholique 2056 (September 6 & 20, 1992) 786-790. A Greek translation was published in the July 21 and 28,
1992, issues of ÊáèïëéêÞ (Athens). Italian: “Direttive per l’apostolato cattolico nell’ex Unione Sovietica, La Civiltà Cattolica
3415 (October 3, 1992) 66-75. Slightly edited versions of the document were published in both the English and French
editions of Ecumenism [Montreal] 107 (September 1992).
6
http://www.cnewa.org/ecc-bodypg-us.aspx?eccpageID=81&IndexView=alpha
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M etropolitan Hilarion of Kostroma (as head of the External Relations office of the M oscow
Patriarchate) stresses, that “Catholic bishops and apostolic administrators should inform the ruling
bishops of the Orthodox Church of all important pastoral initiatives, especially the creation of new
parishes”, and “notify representatives of the Orthodox Church of any initiatives of a social
character (including educational and charity activities).” 7
Hilarion went on to claim that the principles “have unfortunately not been followed by
Catholic structures in Russia and the CIS, leading to tensions between Orthodox and Catholics in
these countries.” No facts are given, but the accusation is present.
Catholic media activity as a tool of evangelization is not likely in Russia. Its development
may cause interest in Catholic teaching and even persons asking for baptism - which means
“proselytism”.
The second important factor is the manner of coverage of Orthodox-Catholic relations, both in
W estern and Russian media. Catholics in Russia are used to generalized accusations going on over
many years about “proselytizing activity” and “stealing Orthodox souls” without concrete facts
given. Russian Catholics are used to not seeing our bishops and priests invited to take part in big
Orthodox-Catholic events. No bishops, no priests, no lay people. Catholics used to be silent in order
not to harm ecumenical dialogue. The problem is that, according to observations, in m any cases
they have no right to reply when they are accused.
During the conference “To Give a Soul to Europe. The M ission and Responsibility of the
Churches” (Vienna, M ay 2006) M oscow Patriarchate priest Igor Vyzhanov, secretary for interChristian relations in the Department for External Church Relations, called upon Russian Catholics
“to stop looking at Orthodox, if not through the gun-sight, then through very bad binoculars”. 8
This appeal was widely quoted by the media, but the media did not look for somebody among the
Russian Catholics to reply to this accusation. Everything said by officials of the Russian Orthodox
Church was taken as axiomatic and true, journalists (with a few exceptions) did not try to check the
facts, (unfortunately, normally there are no facts in such accusations) or at least to give the floor to
those accused. This is a problem of professionalism, of maintaining standards and objectivity for
balanced coverage.
A priest of the M oscow Patriarchate remarked that “the time of ‘cavalry-like attacks’ made
by Catholic missionaries from Eastern Europe has already passed.” It is evident from this speech
who is guilty of very poor relations between Orthodox and Catholic believers in Russia. Are there
any facts to substantiate the “cavalry-like attacks made by Catholic missionaries from Eastern
Europe”? The audience has been given nothing as proof. It simply has to believe it.
The organizers of the conference in Vienna did not give the floor for a reply. The mass
media did not mention any voice expressing doubts about the accusations of the highly positioned
Orthodox priest.
3. M edia Policy
Despite a general friendly attitude of the Russian media towards Catholics, media texts
represent them as a community of foreigners. In most cases it is not an intentionally invented and
approved policy, just convention, not comprehended and reflected upon enough. Journalists are
poorly informed about the life of the Church and this leads to numerous mistakes and distortions.

7
Then Bishop Hilarion of Vienna and Austria. The Practical Application of the Principle of Canonical Territory.
http://www.stmarywichita.org/bh2.pdf
8
http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=1387
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Coverage of different faiths is disproportionate, with the highest priority being to the Russian
Orthodox Church.
The effects of such coverage for Catholics are dramatic sometimes. Local authorities as a
part of the audience, perceive Catholics as strangers (foreigners). So on many decisions by
authorities (approving land for church building construction, issuing visas for foreign priests, etc.)
they are not in favor of them.
The mass media pay attention to the Catholic Church only during Christmas, Easter, St.
Valentine's Day, and Carnival, with an emphasis on how these holidays are exotic in Russia and
how they are celebrated in the W est.
W hat then are the essential features of the “marginalizing” media policy? Specific elements
to note are the language employed, the area of coverage, and a form of ethnic determinism.
A. Language.
Journalists systematically use words adopted from foreign languages for Catholics, when
there are Russian words with totally the same meaning and connotation. The problem is not only
with language but with adequately reflecting reality. Ethnic or territorial limiting of Christianity
by national or territorial frames appear as a distortion of Christianity.
This creates the stereotype that Catholics do not want to integrate into local culture.
M eanwhile Catholic worship is held in Russian, the majority of Catholics use the Russian language
in everyday life, as well as in publications and documents. Appeals of Catholics to remove the
foreign label from mass media content were not heard by journalists.
Russian journalists become involuntary participants in the marginalization of the Russian
Catholic Church. They help form the image of the “Church-stranger” in the minds of the ordinary
media audience and in the perceptions of official decision makers. That is dangerous for both
believers and officials.
This is a vicious circle. The feedback loop in word usage becomes evident. Society looking
for patterns turns to media, journalists refer to existing language practices.
B. Area of coverage.
Catholics are described simply as a Western phenomenon, plus there are certain
“geographic” circumstances causing distortion about a Catholic minority in Russia.9 M edia texts
in cyberspace represent the Catholic Church as the Church of foreigners.
The Russian Catholic hierarchy expressed protests about such “marginalization” many
times, especially after Catholics were declared as ‘non-traditional’ religion in Russia, despite the
fact that a Catholic presence in the country was deeply rooted over many centuries. Finally we have
a false and corrupted image of the Catholic Church in the Russian media.
Journalists systematically use words adopted from foreign languages. This creates the
stereotype that Catholics in Russia are foreigners who do not want to integrate into local culture.
M eanwhile Russian Catholic Bishops’ Conference data say: masses are held in Russian, the majority
of Catholics are ethnic Russians using Russian in everyday life; Russian is used in Catholic
publications and documents.

9

This minority consists of 1% of the Russian population.
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The Center for M ass Communication Studies conducted a survey of news agency materials
about religious life.10 The main conclusion was that the media appear as the instrument of
marginalization of “strangers” (see figure 2).
Fig. 2. Geography of Media Texts about Catholicism

The media strengthen opposition between “our faith” and “faith of outsiders”. Ethnic and
geographical determinism takes place. Myths and stereotypes of mass consciousness dominate in
information agencies.
Dependence of the media on state policy in the religious sphere exists. It is not strongly
articulated but could be seen in signs of attention to religious organizations (to “traditional”
religions – Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism).
C. Ethnic Determinism.
In mass consciousness, the stereotype that “Russians are Orthodox”, which contradicts
both Orthodox and Catholic doctrines, is very much alive in mass media content. There is an
evident temptation for journalists to feed the audience not with what is happening in reality but
with what fits into people expectations, based on myths and stereotypes.
3. Policy of the Catholic Hierarchy
“Rapid development” - these words of Pope John Paul II are precise to characterize the
growing presence of Russian Catholics in the public sphere, and for the development of the Church
media between 1991 and 2002. As Catholic institutions grew and strengthened, local mass media
began to appear - radio stations (M oscow and St. Petersburg), television (Novosibirsk), and the
publications of a seminary, college, Caritas, monastic orders, and congregations, as well as
numerous parish bulletins, were started. Aside from that, the return of intensive publishing activity
also included Russian-language publications of basic liturgical and dogmatic texts as well as a large
quantity of theological literature addressed to diverse audience groups.

10
Gapless content-analysis of text published on web-sites of five Russian information agencies in JanuaryOctober, 2007 was conducted at the Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University Lomonosov.
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Since it was very difficult and expensive to get access to the government-controlled
television and radio stations, print media (newspapers and magazines) played a special role in
uniting the Catholics of Russia.
À. The Press
The recognition of the extrem e need to find Catholics, return them to the bosom of the
Church as well as preaching the Gospel among people who had never heard of Christ after three
generations of atheism led to the first establishing of the monthly magazine “Truth and Life”
(December 1990), and then to the launch of the weekly Catholic newspaper “The Light of the
Gospel” (October 1994).
There were several other publications (see fig. 3). M ost of them disappeared, but some still
exist, as occasional publications.
Fig. 3. Catholic press in Russia (without parish publications)
Publisher

Publication (started/closed)

Russian
Bishops’ Conference
Diocese in Novosibirsk

The Llight of the Gospel (1994 2007)
Siberian C atholic n ew spaper
(1995-2008, 2009 - till now)
Diocese in Saratov
Climent (2005-2008)
Truth and life
Truth and Life (1991-2008)
F r a n c i s c a n p u b l i s h i n g Your M essenger (1994-2002)
house
Little knight (1994-1997)
Brother Son (2006-2009)
Silesians’ publishing house The Holy Joy (1994-till now)
(M oscow)
Catholic Seminary
Vocation (1994-till now)
in Saint-Petersburg
Catholic College
Theology (1992-1997)
in M oscow
Catechization center
Rainbow (2005-till now)
in Saint-Petersburg
Catechization center
Stromaty (1997-1999)
in M oscow
Kaliningrad
T h e K a lin in g rad C atho lic
vicariat
messenger (1992-1997)

Circulation

Frequency

4500

weekly

2500

monthly

1000
2000
1500

4 times a year
monthly
2 per year

1000
500
1500

2 per year
6 per year
monthly

500

monthly

1000

6 per year

500

6 per year

1000

monthly

1000

monthly

“Svet Evangelia” was a national Catholic newspaper. It provided information about the
history, traditions and liturgy of the Catholic Church for readers from all over the Russian
Federation as well as readers from former Soviet countries, the United States and W estern Europe.
M any of the readers had access to the usual forms of church and worship life. “Svet
Evangelia” brought them into contact with Christianity throughout the world and deepened their
knowledge of their faith.
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B. Radio and Television
There are neither Catholic television channels in Russia nor any regular broadcasts on
secular channels. In Novosibirsk the Catholic television studio “Kana” was operating (1994-2008).
It was founded by Bishop Josef W erth. For the most part, the studio produced “Catholic Video
M agazine” for parishes in the former Soviet Union. It included news of Catholic life in Russia and
other countries, information about the Pope's activities, news reports from parishes and all sorts
of church organizations, feature stories about charitable work and Christian mass media, the
testimonies of believers and interviews with interesting people.
The “Dar” Catholic radio station in M oscow broadcasted one hour every day on a Christian
radio channel (1995-2009). The channel's broadcast schedule consisted of four parts: the Orthodox
radio program “Sofia”, the religious radio program “Blagovest”, the Catholic radio program “Dar”
and the youth program “Prologue”. Specialists qualified in history, theology, literature, psychology
and sociology hosted the programs. They included both priests and lay people. Aside from the
programs that present information on different topics, there are also programs that allow listeners
to talk on-air with the hosts about a wide variety of different issues. The broadcasts were aimed at
widening inter-confessional dialogue and searching for the common ground that people from
different branches of Christianity share.
C. Internet
The bishops of Russia were planning to take serious steps to develop Catholic internet
projects soon. The site catholic.ru was expected to be transformed into a portal for all Russianspeaking Catholics living in the former Soviet Union. A special seminar dedicated to the subject
was held from February 10 to 14, 2003 in W arsaw. At the seminar, participants prepared a project
that called for the establishing of a dynamic and stream lined office for the dissemination of
information. The project was never implemented, not even partially.
4. The “Self-silencing” Phenomenon
Since mid-2000 the Catholic hierarchy itself does not seem to seek publicity and a presence
in the mass media. Last year’s experts underline the process of “self-silencing” of Russian Catholics
(closing newspapers, radio stations, other media).
W e use the word “silencing” in the sense, explored by Father John Flynn in his article
“Silencing the Pope” published by Zenit agency January 20, 2008. He focused on the case of the
intolerance of radical secularism that led Pope Benedict XVI to cancel his planned visit and speech
at Rome's La Sapienza University.
But the Russian case differs a lot. M ostly there were no external but largely internal factors
that try to silence the Catholic community in Russia. It is not somebody from outside - state
authorities, radical secularists, other religious' leaders, etc - but Catholics themselves who are the
main players in the silencing process. That is why we call it “self-silencing”.
What are its main features? Open and outspoken positions towards both the external world
and the local Catholic com munity gradually changed back to “no comments” style and a
“conspiratorial” mentality, without providing any explanations to either the external world or the
local Catholic community. There were no public explanations regarding the closing of media oneby-one - “Svet Evangelia” (2007), Russian National TV studio “Kana” (2008), Catholic radio station
“Dar” (2009), etc.
If anyone (journalist, scholar, politician, whoever) would like to obtain some very basic
official information regarding the Catholic Church in Russia (number of parishes, believers, priests,
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bishops, structures, institutions, whatever) - at the moment there is no source. The official Russian
Catholic Bishops' conference website from 2008 is permanently “under construction”.
Catholics became “invisible” on the religious landscape in Russia and its public sphere.
5. Conclusion: W hat are the W ays for Transition from Strangers to Citizens?
W hen we take into consideration:
!
State control (political, economic, social, cultural),
!
Low religious activity in the public sphere, lack of influence,
!
Vicious circle: no religious content – no interest to religion; no interest – no content,
!
Ethnic approach to religious identity (“if you are Russian you should be Orthodox”),
!
“Ghetto” approach and “conspiratorial mentality” of Catholics,
!
Lack of resources to be competitive in the field of traditional mass media,
then the most effective strategy for Catholics, in order to change their image in the public sphere
and the perception of them by the government, must include:
!
legal standing for their rights, guaranteed by Constitution and Russian law
!
equal and transparent dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church
!
openness towards mass media,
!
providing official and 24/7 accessible sources of information
!
step-by-step education of secular journalists (meetings, “open doors” days, etc.)
!
cheap and effective new media usage (blogs, forums, etc.)
!
and - last but most important - being active citizens, not passive spectators of the games
played above their heads.
According to latest observations, the “self-silencing” time for Catholics continues.
Proposed strategies for change are still far from implementation.
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